On August 26, 2026, President Trump issued Executive Order 14421, “Declaring a National Emergency to Secure the United States Bulk-Power System,” establishing a new national security framework for evaluating certain foreign-produced electric infrastructure equipment used in the U.S. bulk-power system. The Order authorizes the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) to prohibit, condition, license, or otherwise regulate certain transactions involving foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment where DOE determines that the equipment, or associated technologies and services, are linked to a Covered Foreign Entity and present one or more of the national security risks identified in the Order.

On September 9, 2026, DOE’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (“CESER”) took the first step toward implementing the Executive Order by issuing a Request for Information (“RFI”) seeking public comment on key aspects of the program. Comments are due by October 9, 2026.  The RFI signals that DOE intends to move quickly in developing regulations that could affect utilities, independent power producers, renewable energy developers, equipment manufacturers, battery storage providers, and data center operators. This move follows recent action taken by the FCC to prohibit foreign produced inverters due to a cited national security determination. 

What the Executive Order Does

The Executive Order declares that certain foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment may present an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and critical infrastructure due to cybersecurity vulnerabilities, supply chain dependence, and the potential for unauthorized access or disruption of electric system operations.

Under the Order, DOE may review transactions involving foreign-produced bulk-power system electric equipment and:

• Prohibit acquisitions, imports, transfers, or installations;
• Allow transactions subject to mitigation measures and security conditions;
• Require monitoring, isolation, or remediation measures; and
• Impose conditions on the continued operation of existing equipment.

Importantly, the Order extends beyond physical equipment and applies to associated software, firmware, maintenance services, digital services, and remote-access capabilities.

Why It Matters for Energy and Data Center Projects

The Administration explicitly links the Executive Order to the increasing importance of reliable electric infrastructure needed to support artificial intelligence, data centers, advanced manufacturing, and defense production. As a result, infrastructure supporting large-scale electric loads, including hyperscale and AI-focused data center developments, may receive heightened scrutiny where covered bulk-power system equipment and the foreign-entity and risk factors identified in the Order are present.

Although the Order does not impose a blanket prohibition on foreign-manufactured equipment, it establishes a framework under which DOE may identify, review, prohibit, condition, or require the cessation of certain acquisitions, importations, transfers, or installations involving equipment associated with Covered Foreign Entities that DOE determines present unacceptable risks to the security or resilience of the U.S. bulk-power system. Transactions that occurred before August 26, 2026 are not impacted by the order, however DOE does have authority to take retroactive action under specific circumstances. 

Equipment Potentially Within Scope

DOE has not yet finalized the scope of covered equipment. However, the Executive Order provides a detailed definition of “bulk-power system electric equipment” and indicates that implementation may reach a broad range of bulk-power system assets. The Order defines “foreign-produced” equipment as equipment that is not manufactured, produced, or assembled in the United States. DOE’s RFI specifically seeks comment on how that definition should apply in practice, including issues relating to final assembly, substantial transformation, domestic content, contract manufacturing, refurbishment, and the incorporation of foreign components. Identified Equipment includes: 

• Grid-connected inverters;
• Battery energy storage systems (BESS);
• Large power transformers;
• Utility-scale, backup, and certain small generators;
• Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems supporting critical infrastructure;
• Substation equipment;
• Protective relays and metering equipment;
• High-voltage circuit breakers;
• Industrial control systems, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units (RTUs), and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs);
• Distributed control systems and safety instrumented systems; and
• Associated software, firmware, remote-access capabilities, lifecycle maintenance and update mechanisms, and other relevant supply-chain dependencies.

The White House has emphasized that the Order does not apply to facilities used solely for local distribution of electric energy. The distinction between local distribution infrastructure and transmission-connected facilities serving major industrial or data center loads will likely be a central issue during rulemaking.

DOE's Request for Information

DOE's RFI seeks stakeholder input on numerous implementation issues, including:

• The scope of covered equipment and transactions;
• Risks associated with foreign suppliers and technologies;
• Software, firmware, maintenance, and remote-access practices;
• Existing equipment deployed on the grid;
• Potential mitigation measures;
• Vendor licensing and prequalification mechanisms;
• Domestic manufacturing capacity and supply chain resilience; and
• Economic, reliability, safety, and small-business impacts.

Immediate Considerations for Industry

Companies involved in energy infrastructure and data center development should begin assessing:

• Whether existing or planned projects rely on equipment that could be considered bulk-power system electric equipment;
• The extent to which foreign-origin hardware, software, firmware, or remote-access capabilities are embedded within critical systems;
• Potential exposure arising from current supplier relationships and procurement plans;
• Whether planned projects could be affected by future DOE determinations or mitigation requirements; and
• Participation in DOE’s RFI process to help shape implementation of the Order.

Looking Ahead

EO 14421 represents one of the most significant federal actions affecting electric infrastructure supply-chain security since the original bulk-power system executive order issued in 2020. While many implementation details remain unresolved, the combination of the Executive Order and DOE’s RFI signals a heightened federal focus on the cybersecurity, resiliency, and foreign ownership, control, jurisdiction, and direction risks associated with equipment supporting the nation’s increasingly electricity-intensive economy. Utilities, developers, manufacturers, and data center operators should closely monitor DOE’s rulemaking process and evaluate potential exposure now, before regulations are finalized.

Womble Bond Dickinson will continue to monitor DOE’s implementation of EO 14421 and related developments affecting the energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and data center sectors. Clients with questions regarding the Executive Order, supply chain reviews, or participation in DOE’s rulemaking process should contact a member of the firm’s Government Affairs, Energy, Privacy and Cybersecurity, or International Trade teams.